Abstract-Emerging systems such as smart grids or intelligent transportation systems often require end-user applications to continuously send information to external data aggregators performing monitoring or control tasks. This can result in an undesirable loss of privacy for the users in exchange of the benefits provided by the application. Motivated by this trend, this paper introduces privacy concerns in a system theoretic context, and addresses the problem of releasing filtered signals that respect the privacy of the user data streams. Our approach relies on a formal notion of privacy from the database literature, called differential privacy, which provides strong privacy guarantees against adversaries with arbitrary side information. Methods are developed to approximate a given filter by a differentially private version, so that the distortion introduced by the privacy mechanism is minimized. Two specific scenarios are considered. First, the notion of differential privacy is extended to dynamic systems with many participants contributing independent input signals. Kalman filtering is also discussed in this context, when a released output signal must preserve differential privacy for the measured signals or state trajectories of the individual participants. Second, differentially private mechanisms are described to approximate stable filters when participants contribute to a single event stream, extending previous work on differential privacy under continual observation.
I. INTRODUCTION
A rapidly growing number of applications require users to release private data streams to third-party applications for signal processing and decision-making purposes. Examples include smart grids, population health monitoring, online recommendation systems, traffic monitoring, fuel consumption optimization, and cloud computing for industrial control systems. For privacy, confidentiality or security reasons, the participants benefiting from the services provided by these systems generally do not want to release more information than strictly necessary.
In a smart grid for example, a customer could receive better rates in exchange of continuously sending to the utility company her instantaneous power consumption, thereby helping to improve the demand forecast mechanism. In doing so however, she is also informing the utility or a potential eavesdropper about the type of appliances she owns as well as her daily activities [3] . Similarly, individual private signals can be recovered from published outputs aggregated from many users, and anonymizing a dataset is not enough to guarantee privacy, due to the existence of public side information. This is demonstrated in [4] , [5] for example, where private ratings and transactions from individuals on commercial websites are successfully inferred with the help of information from public recommendation systems. Emerging traffic monitoring systems using position measurements from smartphones [6] is another application area where individual position traces can be re-identified by correlating them with public information such as a person's location of residence or work [6] , [7] . Hence, the development of rigorous privacy preserving mechanisms is crucial to address the justified concerns of potential users and thus encourage an increasing level of participation, which can in turn greatly improve the efficiency of these large-scale systems.
Precisely defining what constitutes a breach of privacy is a delicate task. A particularly successful recent definition of privacy used in the database literature is that of differential privacy [8] , which is motivated by the fact that any useful information provided by a dataset about a group of people can compromise the privacy of specific individuals due to the existence of side information. Differentially private mechanisms randomize their responses to dataset analysis requests and guarantee that whether or not an individual chooses to contribute her data only marginally changes the distribution over the published outputs. As a result, even an adversary cross-correlating these outputs with other sources of information cannot infer much more about specific individuals after publication than before [9] .
Most work related to privacy is concerned with the analysis of static databases [8] , [10] - [12] , whereas cyber-physical systems clearly emphasize the need for mechanisms working with dynamic, time-varying data streams. Recently, the problem of releasing differentially private statistics when the input data takes the form of a binary stream describing event occurrences aggregated from many participants has been considered in [13] - [15] . This work forms the basis for the scenario studied in Section VI, and is discussed in more details in Section VI-C. However, most of this paper is devoted to a different situation where participants individually provide real-valued signals. A differentially private version of the iterative averaging algorithm for consensus is considered in [16] . In this case, the input data to protect consists of the initial values of the participants and is 0018-9286 © 2013 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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thus a single vector, but the update mechanism subject to privacy attacks is dynamic. Information-theoretic approaches have also been proposed to guarantee some level of privacy when releasing time series [17] , [18] . However, the resulting privacy guarantees only hold if the statistics of the participants' data streams obey the assumptions made (typically stationarity, dependence and distributional assumptions), and require the explicit statistical modeling of all available side information. This task is very difficult in general as new side information can become available after releasing the results. In contrast, differential privacy is a worst-case notion that holds independently of any probabilistic assumption on the dataset, and provides guarantees (different from those of [17] , [18] ) against adversaries with arbitrary side information [9] . Once such a privacy guarantee is enforced, one can still leverage potential additional statistical information about the dataset to improve the quality of the outputs. The main contribution of this paper is to introduce privacy concerns in the context of systems theory. Section II provides some technical background on differential privacy. We then formulate in Section III the problem of releasing the output of a dynamical system while preserving differential privacy for the driving inputs, assumed to originate from different participants. It is shown that accurate results can be published for systems with small incremental gains with respect to the individual input channels. These results are extended in Section IV to the problem of designing a differentially private Kalman filter, as an example of situation where additional information about the process generating the individual signals can be leveraged to publish more accurate results. Finally, Section VI is motivated by the recent work on "differential privacy under continual observation" [13] , [14] , and considers systems processing a single integer-valued signal describing the occurrence of events originating from many individual participants. Throughout the paper, differentially private approximations of the systems are proposed with the goal of minimizing the mean squared error (MSE) introduced by the privacy preserving mechanisms.
II. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this section, we review the notion of differential privacy [8] as well as some basic mechanisms that can be used to achieve it when the released data belongs to a finite-dimensional vector space. In the original papers on differential privacy [8] , [10] , [19] , a sanitizing mechanism has access to a database and provides noisy answers to queries submitted by data analysts wishing to draw inference from the data. However, the notion of differential privacy can be defined for fairly general types of datasets. Most of the results in this section are known, but in some cases we provide more precise or slightly different versions of some statements made in previous work. We refer the reader to the surveys by Dwork, e.g., [20] , for additional background on differential privacy.
Definition
Let us fix some probability space . Let be a space of datasets of interest (e.g., a space of data tables, or a signal space). A mechanism is just a map , for some measurable output space , where denotes a -algebra, such that for any element , is a random variable, typically written simply . A mechanism can be viewed as a probabilistic algorithm to answer a query , which is a map . In some cases, we index the mechanism by the query of interest, writing . 1) Example 1: Let , with each real-valued entry of corresponding to some sensitive information for an individual contributing her data, e.g., her salary. A data analyst would like to know the average of the entries of , i.e., the query is with . As detailed in Section II-B, a typical mechanism to answer this query in a differentially private way computes and blurs the result by adding a random variable , so that with . Note that in the absence of perturbation , an adversary who knows and all for can recover the remaining entry exactly if he learns . This can deter people from contributing their data, even though broader participation improves the accuracy of the analysis and thus can provide useful knowledge to the population.
2) Example 2:
A database could record, for participants, a -tuple of binary values for the presence or absence of attributes, e.g., being less that 50 years old. For statistical analysis purposes, it is typically sufficient to consider this dataset as a vector , where represents the number of occurrences of the k-tuple . While this histogram representation removes certain obvious forms of identification, e.g., names, publishing it still carries considerable privacy risks due to the possibility of linking its information to other public datasets, in order to re-identify individuals for example [21] . Small entries in the vector , corresponding to attributes characterizing few peoples, are particularly sensitive [22] . An alternative to publishing or a perturbed version of it, is to keep secure and force analysts to directly send their query to the database server, which can then provide an approximate answer and better control the leakage of private information [8] , [23] . For example, a linear query of the form for can be used to request simultaneously marginals, partial histograms, etc. Much work has been done on answering such statistical queries in a differentially private way, see, e.g., [12] and [19] .
3) Example 3: We consider in Section V a road traffic monitoring system, where individuals send their location to a data aggregator at discrete time intervals, and receive a dynamic estimate of the average traffic velocity on a road segment of interest. For users, the dataset consists of discrete-time position signals , with , and a query is also a signal , where denotes the indicator function and the road segment. Next, we introduce the notion of differential privacy [8] , [10] 
If
, the mechanism is said to be -differentially private. In words, this definition says that for two adjacent datasets, the distributions over the outputs of the mechanism should be close. The choice of the parameters is set by the privacy policy. Typically is taken to be a small constant, e.g., or perhaps even or . The parameter should be kept small as it controls the probability of certain significant losses of privacy, e.g., when a zero probability event for input becomes an event with positive probability for input in (1) .
Remark 1: The definition of differential privacy depends on the adjacency relation . However, we often omit to mention it when is clear from the context. Definition 1 also depends on the choice of -algebra . When we need to state this -algebra explicitly, we write . In particular, this -algebra should be sufficiently large, since (1) (2) .
: Let be a bound on . For any , we divide the interval into consecutive intervals of length , and we let and be the midpoint of the interval . Then (c) holds for the simple function , and these functions approximate . We conclude using the dominated convergence theorem.
: Take and use the fact that is -bounded.
Finally, we mention that for the special case , the implication is shown in [25] . A fundamental property of the notion of differential privacy is that no additional privacy loss can occur by simply manipulating an output that is differentially private. This result is similar in spirit to the data processing inequality from information theory [26] . To state it, recall that a probability kernel between two measurable spaces and is a function such that is measurable for each and is a probability measure for each . 
Then is -differentially private. Note that in (4), the kernel is not allowed to depend on the dataset . In other words, this condition says that once is known, the distribution of does not further depend on . The theorem says that a mechanism accessing a dataset only indirectly via the output of a differentially private mechanism cannot weaken the privacy guarantee. Hence, postprocessing can be used freely to improve the accuracy of an output, as in Section VI for example, without worrying about a possible loss of privacy. Similarly, an adversary processing a differentially private output without accessing the original data cannot weaken the guarantee.
Proof: To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous proof of the resilience to postprocessing theorem available for the case of randomized postprocessing and . Let be -differentially private. We have, for two adjacent elements and for any in
The first equality is just the smoothing property of conditional expectations, and the inequality comes from (3) applied to the function . Since is a probability kernel, the integral on the second line defines a measure on , which is -bounded since .
A. Basic Differentially Private Mechanisms
A mechanism that throws away all the information in a dataset is obviously private, but not useful, and in general one has to trade off privacy for utility when answering specific queries. We recall below two basic mechanisms that can be used to answer queries in a differentially private way. We are only concerned in this section with queries that return numerical answers, i.e., here a query is a map , where the output space equals for some , is equipped with a norm denoted , and the -algebra on is taken to be the standard Borel -algebra, denoted . The following quantity plays an important role in the design of differentially private mechanisms [8] .
Definition 2: Let be a space equipped with an adjacency relation . The sensitivity of a query is defined as
In particular, for equipped with the -norm for , we denote the -sensitivity by . 1) Laplace Mechanism: This mechanism, proposed in [8] , modifies an answer to a numerical query by adding independent and identically distributed (i.i. Note that the mechanism requires each coordinate of to have standard deviation proportional to , as well as inversely proportional to the privacy parameter (here . For example, if simply consists of repetitions of the same scalar query, then increases linearly with , and the quadratically growing variance of the noise added to each coordinate prevents an adversary from averaging out the noise.
Proof: We have, for measurable and two adjacent datasets in , since by the triangle inequality. With the choice of , we obtain the definition (1) of differential privacy (i.e., with ).
2) Gaussian Mechanism:
This mechanism, proposed in [10] , is similar to the Laplace mechanism but adds i.i.d. Gaussian noise to provide -differential privacy, with but typically a smaller for the same utility. First, recall the definition of the -function:
The following theorem tightens the analysis from [10] . . We are then led to set sufficiently large so that , i.e., . The result then follows by straightforward calculation.
As an illustration of the theorem, to guarantee -differential privacy with and , the standard deviation of the Gaussian noise should be about 2.65 times the -sensitivity of . For the rest of the paper, we define so that the standard deviation in Theorem 3 can be written . It can be shown that can be bounded by .
III. DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE DYNAMIC SYSTEMS
In this section, we introduce the notion of differential privacy for dynamic systems. We start with some notations and technical prerequisites. All signals are discrete-time signals, start at time 0, and all systems are assumed to be causal. "Linear and time-invariant" is abbreviated by LTI, and "single-input single-output" by SISO. For each time , let be the truncation operator, so that for any signal we have .
Hence, a deterministic system is causal if and only if . We denote by the space of sequences with values in and such that if and only if has finite -norm for all integers . The norm and norm of a stable transfer function are defined, respectively, as , , where denotes the maximum singular value of a matrix .
We consider situations in which private participants contribute input signals driving a dynamic system and the queries consist of output signals of this system. First, in this section, we Fig. 1 . Illustrative example of a system computing the sum of the moving averages (MA) of input signals contributed by individual participants. A differentially private version of this system, for the adjacency relation (5), guarantees to user that the distribution of the output signal does not vary significantly when her input varies in -norm by at most . In particular, the distribution of the output signal will not change significantly if user 's input is zero ( , e.g., because the user is not present), or is not zero but satisfies .
assume that the input of a system consists of signals, one for each participant. An input signal is denoted , with for some and . A simple example is that of a dynamic system releasing at each period the average over the past periods of the sum of the input values of the participants, i.e., with output at time , see Fig. 1 . For and , an adjacency relation can be defined on for example by if and only if and differ by exactly one component signal, and moreover this deviation is bounded. That is, let us fix a set of nonnegative numbers , , and define iff for some (5) and for all
A. Finite-Time Criterion for Differential Privacy
To approximate dynamic systems by versions respecting the differential privacy of the individual participants, we consider mechanisms of the form , i.e., producing for any input signal a stochastic process with sample paths in . As in Section II, this requires that we first specify the measurable sets of . We start by defining in a standard way the measurable sets of , the space of sequences with values in , to be the -algebra denoted generated by the so-called finite-dimensional cylinder sets of the form and where denotes the vector (see, e.g., [27, Ch. 2]). The measurable sets considered for the output of are then obtained by intersection of with the sets of . The resulting -algebra is denoted and is generated by the sets of the form (6) for . As for the dynamic systems of interest, we constrain in this paper the mechanisms to be causal, i.e., the distribution of should be the same as that of for any and any time . In other words, the values for do not influence the values of the mechanism output up to time . The following technical lemma is useful to show that a mechanism on signal spaces is -differentially private by considering only finite dimensional problems. 
B. Basic Dynamic Mechanisms
Recall (see, e.g., [28] ) that for a system with inputs in and output in , its -to-incremental gain is defined as the smallest number such that Now consider, for and , a system defined by (8) where , for all . The next theorem generalizes the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms of Theorems 2 and 3 to causal dynamic systems.
Theorem 4: Let be defined as in (8) and consider the adjacency relation (5 
C. Filter Approximation Set-Ups for Differential Privacy
Let for all , be an LTI system as in Corollary 1, and assume for simplicity the same bound for the allowed variations in energy of each input signal. We have then two simple mechanisms producing a differentially private version of , depicted on Fig. 2 . The first one directly perturbs each input signal by adding to it a white Gaussian noise with and . These perturbations on each input channel are then passed through , leading to a mean squared error (MSE) for the output equal to . Alternatively, we can add a single source of noise at the output of according to Corollary 1, in which case the MSE is . Both of these schemes should be evaluated depending on the system and the number of participants, as none of the error bound is better than the other in all circumstances. For example, if is small or if the bandwidths of the individual transfer functions do not overlap, the error bound for the input perturbation scheme can be smaller. Another advantage of this scheme is that the users can release differentially private signals themselves without relying on a trusted server. However, there are cryptographic means for achieving the output perturbation scheme without centralized trusted server as well, see, e.g., [29] .
1) Example 4:
Consider again the problem of releasing the average over the past periods of the sum of the input signals, i.e., with , for all . Then , whereas , for all . The MSE for the scheme with the noise at the input is then . With the noise at the output, the MSE is , which is better exactly when , i.e., the number of users is larger than the averaging window.
IV. DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE KALMAN FILTERING
We now discuss the Kalman filtering problem subject to a differential privacy constraint. Compared to Section III, it is assumed here that more is publicly known about the dynamics of the processes producing the individual input signals, and this knowledge can be exploited in the design of privacy mechanisms with better performance. Section V describes an application of the mechanisms presented here to a traffic monitoring problem.
A. Differentially Private Kalman Filter
Consider a set of linear systems, each with independent dynamics (9) where is a standard zero-mean Gaussian white noise process with covariance , and the initial condition is a Gaussian random variable with mean , independent of the noise process . System , for , sends measurements (10) to a data aggregator. We assume for simplicity that the matrices are full row rank. Fig. 3 shows this initial setup. The data aggregator aims at releasing a signal that asymptotically minimizes the MSE with respect to a linear combination of the individual states. That is, the quantity of interest to be estimated at each period is , where are given matrices, and we are looking for a causal estimator constructed from the signals , solution of
The data are assumed to be public information. For all , we assume that the pairs are detectable and the pairs are stabilizable. In the absence of privacy constraint, the minimum mean squared error (MMSE) estimator is , with provided by the steady-state Kalman filter estimating the state of system from [30] , and denoted in the following. Suppose now that the publicly released estimate should guarantee the differential privacy of the participants. This requires that we first specify an adjacency relation on the appropriate space of datasets. Let and denote the global state and measurement signals. Assume say that the mechanism is required to guarantee differential privacy for a subset of the coordinates of the state trajectory . Let the selection matrix be the diagonal matrix with if , and otherwise. Hence sets the coordinates of a vector that do not belong to the set to zero. Fix a vector . The adjacency relation considered here is iff for some (11) and for all
In words, two adjacent global state trajectories differ by the values of a single participant, say . Moreover, for differential privacy guarantees we are constraining the range in energy variation in the signal of participant to be at most . Hence, the distribution on the released results should be essentially the same if a participant's state signal value at some single specific time were replaced by with , but the privacy guarantee should also hold for smaller instantaneous deviations on longer segments of trajectory.
In the language of the previous sections, the dataset consists here of the state trajectories , we have the adjacency relation (11) defined on this space, and the query of interest (i.e., in the absence of privacy constraint) is the signal obtained via Kalman filtering. Note however the slight variation due to the additional constraint: here the data aggregator itself does not have direct access to the data on which the adjacency relation is defined but only to the measurements . Other adjacency relations could be considered, in particular, these could be defined directly on the output space of measured signals . Finally, we aim at designing a mechanism producing a signal approaching as closely as possible the MMSE estimate , while maintaining differential privacy for (11) .
First, in the rest of this subsection, we follow the approach of Section III-C, which simply consists in perturbing the original Kalman filter by adding privacy-preserving white Gaussian noise to certain signals. For the input noise injection mechanism, the noise can be added by each participant directly to their transmitted signal . Namely, since for two state trajectories adjacent according to (11) we have , the variation for the corresponding measured signals can be bounded as follows:
Hence, differential privacy can be guaranteed if participant adds to a white Gaussian noise with covariance matrix , where is the dimension of . Note that in this sensitivity computation the measurement noise has the same realization independently of the considered variation in . With this perturbation, the signals transmitted by the participants are already differentially private. Moreover, in contrast to the basic input perturbation mechanism of Section III-C, the data aggregator here can modify the original Kalman filters by viewing the privacy-preserving noise as additional measurement noise and improve the asymptotic estimation performance, see Section V.
Next, consider the output noise injection mechanism. Since we assume that is public information, the initial condition of each state estimator is fixed. Consider now two state trajectories , adjacent according to (11) (11) .
B. Filter Redesign for Stable Systems
In the rest of Section IV, we aim at improving the output perturbation mechanism of Theorem 5, by redesigning the filter to optimize the overall MSE performance. This MSE is controlled both by the dynamics of the filter as well as the amount of privacy-preserving noise introduced at the output, which is a function of the norm of the filter. Hence, we pursue the design of a filter that balances quality of estimation and size of its norm.
We consider the design of filters of the form (12)
for , where are matrices to determine. The overall system in front of the privacy-preserving noise source produces the estimate of the signal . Assume first in this section that the system matrices are stable, in which case we also restrict the filter matrices to be stable. Moreover, we only consider the design of full order filters, i.e., the dimensions of are greater or equal to those of , for all . Denote the overall state for each system and associated filter by . The combined dynamics from to the estimation error can be written where
The steady-state MSE for the estimator is then . Let us now consider the additional impact of the privacy-preserving noise on the overall MSE.
Considering as in the previous subsection the sensitivity of filter 's output to a change from a state trajectory to an adjacent one according to (11) , and letting , we see that the change in the output of filter follows the dynamics:
Hence, the -sensitivity can be measured by the norm of the transfer function (14) Replacing the Kalman filter in Theorem 5, the MSE for the resulting output perturbation mechanism guaranteeing -privacy is then with . Thus, minimizing this MSE leads us to the following optimization problem:
Assume without loss of generality that for all , since the privacy constraint for the signal vanishes if . The following theorem gives a convex sufficient condition in the form of linear matrix inequalities (LMIs) guaranteeing that a choice of filter matrices satisfies the constraints (16)- (17) . (20) The sufficient condition of the theorem is obtained by adding the constraint (21) and using the change of variable suggested in [32, p. 902] . Namely, assume that there are matrices , and satisfying (19) , (20) , and (21 (22), let , and define the matrices as in (18) . Since is nonsingular, we can then reverse the congruence transformations to recover (19) , (20) , which shows that the constraints (16), (17) are satisfied.
Remark 2: Note that the problem (15) is also linear in . These variables can then be minimized subject to the LMI constraints of Theorem 6 in order to design a good filter trading off estimation error and -sensitivity to minimize the overall MSE. However, including these variables directly in the optimization problem can lead to ill-conditioning in the inversion of the matrices in (18) , a phenomenon discussed together with a recommended fix in [32, p. 903] . In addition, minimizing the objective (15) subject to the LMI constraints is different from solving (15)- (17), due to the conservativeness of the conditions in Theorem 6. As in mixed problems, one could consider more complex algorithms to reduce this conservativeness [33] . Consider now, instead of (15), the objective , where the parameter replaced , subject to the LMIs of Theorem 6. By setting , we recover exactly the Kalman filter. Hence by performing a one-dimensional search over we can attempt to improve the overall MSE of the output mechanism over the basic Kalman filter design.
C. Unstable Systems
If the dynamics (9) are not stable, the linear filter design approach presented in the previous paragraph is not valid. To handle this case, we can further restrict the class of filters. As before we minimize the estimation error variance together with the sensitivity measured by the norm of the filter. Starting from the general linear filter dynamics (12), (13), we can consider designs where is an estimate of , and set so that is an estimate of . The error dynamics then satisfies
Setting
gives an error dynamics independent of (23) and leaves the matrix as the only remaining design variable. Note however that the resulting class of filters contains the (onestep delayed) Kalman filter. To obtain a bounded error, there is an implicit constraint on that should be stable. Now, following the discussion in the previous subsection, minimizing the MSE while enforcing differential privacy leads to the following optimization problem:
Again, one can efficiently check a sufficient condition, in the form of the LMIs of the following theorem, guaranteeing that the constraints (25), (26) are satisfied. Optimizing over the variables can then be done using semidefinite programming.
Theorem 7: The constraints (25) - (26) , for some , are satisfied if there exists matrices such that (27) and (28) If these conditions are satisfied, one can recover an admissible filter matrix by setting . Proof: As in Theorem (6), we simplify the notation below by omitting the subscript . First, from the error dynamics (23), the constraint (25) is satisfied if and only if there exists a positive definite matrix such that [31] with . By letting , introducing the slack variable , the change of variable , and using the Schur complement, these conditions are equivalent to the existence of two positive definite matrices such that (27) is satisfied. The LMI (28) derived from (26) is standard [31] , see also (20) . As in Theorem 6, we restrict the search in this LMI to the same matrix as in (27) , which results in a convex problem but introduces some conservatism.
V. TRAFFIC MONITORING EXAMPLE

A. System Description
Consider a simplified description of a traffic monitoring system, inspired by real-world implementations and associated privacy concerns as discussed in [6] , [34] for example. There are participating vehicles traveling on a straight road segment. Vehicle , for , is represented by its state , with and its position and velocity, respectively. This state evolves as a second-order system with unknown random acceleration inputs where is the sampling period, is a standard white Gaussian noise, and . Assume for simplicity that the noise signals for different vehicles are independent. The traffic monitoring service collects GPS measurements from the vehicles [6] , i.e., receives noisy readings of the positions at the sampling times with The purpose of the traffic monitoring service is to continuously provide an estimate of the traffic flow velocity on the road segment, which is approximated by releasing at each sampling period an estimate of the average velocity of the participating vehicles, i.e., of the quantity (29) With a larger number of participating vehicles, the sample average (29) represents the traffic flow velocity more accurately. However, while individuals are generally interested in the aggregate information provided by such a system, e.g., to estimate their commute time, they do not wish their own trajectories to be publicly revealed, since these might contain sensitive information about their driving behavior, frequently visited locations, etc. Privacy-preserving mechanisms for such location-based services are often based on ad-hoc temporal and spatial cloaking of the measurements [6] , [35] . However, in the absence of a quantitative definition of privacy and a clear model of the adversary's capabilities, it is common that proposed techniques are later argued to be deficient [36] , [37] . The temporal cloaking scheme proposed in [6] for example aggregates the speed measurements of users successively crossing a given line, but does not necessarily protect individual trajectories against adversaries exploiting temporal relationships between these aggregated measurements [36] .
B. Numerical Example
We now discuss some differentially private estimators introduced in Section IV, in the context of this example. All individual systems are identical, hence we drop the subscript in the notation. Assume that the selection matrix is , that m in (11) , and that we have participants. Let , , . A single Kalman filter denoted is designed to provide an estimate of each state vector , so that in absence of privacy constraint the final estimate would be We designed the four mechanisms of Section IV for various values of the privacy parameters . For the output perturbation mechanisms, we used the approach described in Remark 2 to tradeoff estimation error and -norm of the filter. For this scenario however, the -norm of the Kalman filter is already quite small, and we could only improve marginally the MSE of the Kalman filter based output perturbation mechanism, typically by less than one percent (the improvement can be more significant for smaller values of for example). Hence, in the following, we restrict our discussion of output perturbation mechanisms to the simplest scheme that does not redesign the original Kalman filter. Fig. 4 shows the steady-state root-mean-square error (RMSE) of the mechanisms for different values of , with fixed . The input perturbation mechanism, while essentially unusable with the original Kalman filter, shows clearly the best performance when the filter is redesigned by taking the privacy-preserving noise into account as additional measurement noise. The higher performance of this mechanism is especially noticeable in the high-privacy (hence, high-noise) regime, i.e., as becomes small.
However, other measures of performance are also of interest, and in particular Fig. 5 illustrates the convergence time of the input and output perturbation mechanisms. Here, the filters are simply initialized with an incorrect value of the initial average velocity, but this also serves to illustrate situations where we could have a sudden change in traffic velocity, e.g., due to the formation of a traffic jam. In such cases, it is desirable to have fast convergence of the filter, e.g., in order to warn downstream drivers sufficiently soon. For , the output perturbation mechanism converges in few seconds, whereas the input perturbation mechanism takes more than a minute to converge. In this case, the higher asymptotic RMSE of the first mechanism, which nonetheless remains below 2 km/h, might very well be acceptable in view of the much improved convergence speed. Fig. 6 shows the dependence of the convergence time for these two mechanisms as varies.
VI. FILTERING EVENT STREAMS
This section considers an application scenario motivated by the work of [13] and [14] . Assume now that an input signal is integer valued, i.e., for all . Such a signal can record the occurrences of events of interest over time, e.g., the number of transactions on a commercial website, or the number of people newly infected with a virus. As in [13] , [14] , two signals and are adjacent if and only if they differ by one at a single time, or equivalently (30) The motivation for this adjacency relation is that a given individual contributes a single event to the stream, and we want to preserve event-level privacy [13] , that is, hide to some extent the presence or absence of an event at a particular time. This could for example prevent the inference of individual transactions from publicly available collaborative filtering outputs, as in [5] . Now, even though individual events should be hidden, we are still interested in producing approximate filtered versions of the original signal, e.g., a privacy-preserving moving average of the input tracking the frequency of events. The papers [13] , [14] consider specifically the design of a private counter or accumulator, i.e., a system producing an output signal with , where is binary valued. Note that this system is unstable. A number of other filters with slowly and monotonically decreasing impulse responses are considered in [15] , using a technique similar to [14] We continue to measure the utility of specific schemes throughout this section by the MSE between the published and desired outputs. Similarly to our discussion at the end of Section III, there are two straightforward mechanisms that provide differentially private approximations of . One can add white noise directly on the input signal, with for the Laplace mechanism and for the Gaussian mechanism. Or one can add noise at the output of the filter , with for the Laplace mechanism and for the Gaussian mechanism. For the Gaussian mechanism, one obtains in both cases an MSE equal to . For the Laplace mechanism, it is always better to add the noise at the input. Indeed, we obtain in this case an MSE of instead of the greater if the noise is added at the output.
We now generalize these mechanisms to the approximation setup shown on Fig. 7 . The previous mechanisms are recovered when or is the identity operator. To show that one can improve the utility of the mechanism with this setup, consider the following choice of filters and . Let be a causal LTI system with a causal inverse denoted , such that both and have a square summable impulse response. In the following, we use the term minimum phase to refer to such a system . Let . We call this particular choice of filters a zero forcing equalization (ZFE) mechanism. To guarantee -differential privacy, the noise is chosen to be white Gaussian with
. The MSE for a ZFE mechanism with input filter is Hence, we are led to consider the following problem:
where the minimization is over the minimum phase transfer functions . The MSE obtained for the best ZFE mechanism in Theorem 8 cannot be worse than the MSE for the scheme adding noise at the input, and is generally strictly smaller, since by Jensen's inequality we have
In addition, the MSE of the ZFE mechanism is independent of the input signal . However, better performance could be obtained with other schemes, in particular schemes that exploit some knowledge about the input signal. Note that once is chosen, designing is a standard equalization problem [39] . The name of the ZFE mechanism is motivated by the choice of trying to cancel the effect of by using its inverse (zero forcing equalizer). Nonlinear components can be very useful as well. In particular if we add the hypothesis that the input signal is binary valued, as in [13] and [14] , we can modify the simple scheme adding noise at the input by including a detector in front of the system , namely, for , .
This exploits the knowledge that the input signal is binary valued, preserves differential privacy by Theorem 1, and sometimes significantly improves the MSE, depending on other characteristics of the signal.
A. Exploiting Additional Public Knowledge
To further illustrate the idea of exploiting potentially available additional knowledge about the input signal, consider using an MMSE estimator for rather than employing , since the latter can significantly amplify the noise at frequencies where is small. Let us assume that is already chosen, e.g., according to Theorem 8 (this choice is not optimal any more if is not ). Moreover, assume that it is publicly known that is wide-sense stationary with mean and autocorrelation denoted From this data, the second-order statistics of and on Fig. 1 are also known, in particular where , is the impulse signal, and are the impulse responses of and , and . We then design to minimize the MSE For simplicity, consider the case where is restricted to be a finite-impulse response filter, i.e., with the order of the filter. The vector is the solution of the Wiener-Hopf equations [38] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
According to Theorem 1, differential privacy is preserved since the filter only processes the already differentially private signal . Even if the statistical assumptions turn out not to be satisfied by , the privacy guarantee still holds and only performance is impacted. Fig. 8 illustrates the differentially private output obtained by the MMSE mechanism approximating the filter , with the bilinear transformation
1) Example 5:
The input signal is binary valued and the privacy parameters are set to , . For this specific input, the empirical MSE of the ZFE is 5.8, compared to 4.6 for the MMSE mechanism. The simpler scheme with noise added at the input is essentially unusable, since its MSE is . Adding a detector reduces this MSE to about 17.
B. Related Work
Some papers closely related to the event filtering problem considered in this section are [13] - [15] , [40] . As previously mentioned, [13] , [40] consider an unstable filter, the accumulator. The techniques employed there are quite different, relying essentially on binary trees to keep track of intermediate calculations and reduce the amount of noise introduced by the privacy mechanism. Bolot et al. [15] extend this technique to the differentially private approximation of certain filters with monotonic, slowly decaying impulse response. In fact, this technique can be extended to general linear systems by using a state-space realization and keeping track of the system state at carefully chosen times in a binary tree. However, the usefulness of this approach seems to be limited for most practical stable filters, the resulting MSE being typically too large and the implementation of the scheme significantly more complex than for a simple recursive filter.
Finally, as with the MMSE estimation mechanism, one can try to use additional information about the input signals to calibrate the amount of noise introduced by the privacy mechanism. For example, if there exists a sparse representation of the signal in some basis (such as a Fourier or a wavelet basis), then one can try to perturb the representation coefficients in this alternate basis. For example, [40] perturbs the largest coefficients of the discrete Fourier transform of the signal. A difficulty with such approaches is that they are typically not causal and not recursive, requiring an amount of processing that increases with time.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have discussed mechanisms for preserving the differential privacy of individual users transmitting time-varying signals to a trusted central server releasing sanitized filtered outputs based on these inputs. Decentralized versions of the mechanism of Section III can in fact be implemented in the absence of trusted server by means of cryptographic techniques [40] . We believe that research on privacy issues is critical to encourage the development of future cyber-physical systems, which typically rely on the users data to improve their efficiency. Numerous directions of study are open to develop privacy-preserving signal processing systems, including designing better filtering mechanisms, and understanding design tradeoffs between privacy or security and performance in large-scale control systems.
